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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment

in favor of Hood Corporation on the issue of alter ego ?
2.

Should the District Court have reconsidered the Summary

Judgment granted in favor of Hood Corporation on the issue of
alter ego and allowed SLCC to amend its Complaint in view of the
substantial undisputed facts indicating that Hood Corporation is
the alter ego of James Constructors ?
3.

Did the District Court err in holding Salt Lake City

Corporation to a higher standard in judicial proceedings than
other parties ?

STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE RULES
Following is the text of Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which

is discussed

at length in Point II of the

Argument below.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether
it was a claim,
counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of
the claims or parties only upon an expressed
determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a public
between

Salt

Lake

City

construction

Corporation

("SLCC")

contract

and

James

Constructors ("James") for the construction of a pipeline project
known as Contract No. 35-4184, Big Cottonwood Conduit ExtensionTerminal Park Transmission Pipeline ("The Project").

This matter

was originally handled for SLCC by the Salt Lake City Attorney's
office.

In March of 1986, however, SLCC requested that Wilford

A. Beesley, Esq., of the law firm of Beesley & Fairclough, make
his appearance and represent SLCC in this matter.
The case centers on excessive settlement of the backfill in
the

trench

line,

damage

to the installed

pipe,

underground

utilities (sewer, gas and telephone lines, water service lines,
etc.), and other improvements.
from

James

and Hood

Generally, SLCC seeks to recover

Corporation

remedying these defects.

("Hood")

for the costs of

James contends that the project defects

were SLCC's responsibility and that it was wrongfully terminated
from the project.

The Complaint of SLCC alleged that defendant

Hood was liable for remedial costs resulting from the project
defects

based

upon

SLCC's

reliance

upon

Hood's

promotional

literature submitted during the bid selection process.

SLCC also

contends that Hood is the alter ego of James and any liability of
James is imputed to Hood.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On August 21, 1985, the Court granted Hood's Motion for
Summary Judgment with respect to SLCC's claims against Hood. (R.
2

162-63) .

The Court, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, stated that "no factual issues have been raised" by SLCC
with respect to its alter ego claim. (R. 165-66)
After substituted counsel made their appearance, SLCC moved
for reconsideration of the Summary Judgment and for leave to
amend its Complaint to plead its alter ego claim. (R. 223-24)
SLCC argued that if the court had considered the alter ego theory
on its merits, material

issues of fact and undisputed

facts

supporting the alter ego claim precluded summary judgment. (R.
227-49) .

SLCC also argued, inter alia, that the alter ego claim

was not a proper subject

for decision as it had never been

pleaded

and moved

in

its

Complaint

for Leave to Amend

its

Complaint to plead alter ego.
The Court refused to review the merits of SLCC's alter ego
claim,

(R.

299,

302,

303),

stating

that

it

considered" the alter ego issue when Hood moved

had

"fully

for summary

judgment, that it was not in the interests of justice to consider
the matter again, and that to do so would prejudice Hood. (R.
302-304)

The District Court also held that SLCC's Complaint was

sufficient to raise the alter ego issue and that it was properly
before the Court at the prior hearing of Hood's motion. (R. 304).
The District Court further ruled, as a matter of law, that SLCC
is held to a higher standard than other parties to judicial
proceedings, thereby

increasing

its burden otherwise normally

applicable in such matters. (R. 304).
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The District Court's decisions with respect to Hood's Motion
for

Summary

Judgment

thereafter certified

and

SLCC's

Motion

to

Reconsider

were

for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah

Rules of Civil
Procedure.(R. 299, 303, 304).

Jurisdiction of this matter is

conferred upon the Supreme Court by Utah Code Annotated, 78-22(3)(i) (Cumm. Supp. 1986).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following undisputed facts bear upon SLCC's alter ego
claim:
1.

SLCC contracted with James, a wholly owned subsidiary of

Hood, for the construction of the pipe-line project. (Lauhlere
dep., p. 7; R. 366).
2.

James

submitted

Hood

promotional

literature

and

financial statements to SLCC for consideration during the process
of deciding whether to award the project to James Constructors.
(Foreman Dep., pp. 45 - 47; Dep. Exhibit "3"; R. 365).
3.

Hood owns 100% of the stock of James Constructors.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 7; R. 366).
4.

Hood installed James Foreman, one of its long time

employees, as General Manager and Vice-President of James prior
to Hood's

acquisition

of

100% of the stock in said entity.

During this same period of time Foreman was an employee and
representative of Hood.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 11, R. 366; Foreman

Dep. p. 7; R. 3 65).
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5.

After Hood acquired 100% of the stock of James, it then

placed Foreman as President of James.

Hood admitted that this

action may have been taken directly by Hood's Board of Directors.
(Laulhere Dep., p. 12; R. 366).
6.

James kept no separate or formal minutes of any meetings

of its Board of Directors. (James' Answers to Salt Lake City's
First Set of Interrogatories, No. 77).
7.

Foreman was an employee of Hood for several years prior

to his placement with James by Hood (James Foreman Dep., pp. 5-6;
R. 365).
8.
sever

When Hood placed Foreman with James, Foreman did not
his

ties

with

Hood

but

rather

was

acting

representative of Hood and was paid his salary by Hood.

as

the

(Foreman

Dep., p. 7; R. 365).
9.

Hood advanced

provisions or security.

funds to James without any repayment
These advancements were not loans.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 17; R. 366).
10.

Hood also guaranteed loans made by third-parties to

James, including one in an approximate amount of $300,000.00 from
First Security Bank.
11.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 18; R. 366).

No security was ever provided by James for money

advanced or the loans guaranteed by Hood. (Laulhere Dep., p. 34;
R. 366).
12.

Industrial

Indemnity, Hood's bonding company, also

bonded James on its Projects.

(Foreman Dep., p. 10; R. 365).
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13.

Industrial Indemnity, when bonding James1 projects,

relied upon Hood's financial information and strength and did not
ask for financial statements from James. (Ken Evans Dep., pp. 8,
9, 14, 15; R. 362).
14.

Industrial Indemnity's arrangement in bonding James was

to consider the financial position of Hood and its subsidiaries
as one single account. (Ken Evans Dep., pp.14, 15 & 32; R. 362).
15.

The President

of Hood

Corporation, Marc Laulhere,

signed Jame's Indemnity Contract as President of Hood.

(Evans

Dep., p. 18; R. 362).
16.

When Staker Paving brought a claim against James on the

Salt Lake City Pipe Line Project, Marc Laulhere, President of
Hood,

rather than James' personnel, dealt

directly with the

bonding company, Industrial Indemnity, with respect to the claim
against James. (Evans Dep., p. 23; R. 362).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
SLCC contends that the District Court erred in granting Hood
summary judgment on the alter ego issue in view of the issues of
fact and undisputed

facts supporting that claim.

The Court

stated that it had "fully considered" the issue, (R. 3 04) , and
that no issue of fact was present relative to the alter ego
claim. (R. 165-166).

The facts set forth above, however, refute

the Finding of the District Court and establish Hood as the alter
ego of James.

The District Court erred, therefore, in granting

Hood's Summary Judgment inasmuch as material issues of fact exist
6

relative to the alter ego claim and Hood is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
SLCC

further contends that the District

Court

erred in

treating the Summary Judgment as a final judgment and refusing to
review and revise the interlocutory decision as requested under
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
fully considered,

If the Court had

at the first hearing, all the above facts

bearing upon the alter ego issue, then it erred in granting
summary judgment.

If, on the other hand, any of the above facts

were not considered at the first hearing, then the Court erred in
refusing to review its decision when notified by SLCC of such
facts.

Under Rule 54(b), the interlocutory determination of the

District Court was not a final judgment and was subject to review
and revision.
Furthermore, the District Court erred in holding SLCC to a
higher standard in these proceedings than the law required.

SLCC

was prejudiced in this respect in that its arguments and claims
were not considered under the appropriate standards.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING HOOD'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF ALTER EGO.
This Court has consistently held that on appeal

from a

summary judgment, this court will view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the losing party.

Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H

Insurance Company, 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986).

Furthermore,

because of the drastic and harsh nature of summary judgment, "the
7

Court should be reluctant to deprive litigants of an opportunity
to fully present their contentions upon a trial."

Welchman v.

Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2d 410 (1959).
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that summary

judgment cannot be granted where there exists a

genuine issue of fact.

Summary judgment is clearly improper,

therefore, where, as in this case, material issues of fact are
present.

Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H Ins. Co. , 714 P.2d 648

(Utah 1986); Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985);
Reagan

Outdoor

Advertising,

Inc. v.

Lundgren,

692

P.2d

776

(1984).

A.

Genuine and Material Issues of Fact Exist as to Alter Ego
The very nature of an alter ego claim raises issues of fact

and

precludes

the

entry

of

summary

judgment.

In

Amiacs

Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates. 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981),
this Court reversed a summary judgment dismissing a claim of
alter ego.

Finding that summary judgment with respect to the

alter ego claim was improper, the Court stated:
The District Court
plaintiff's alter ego
Dismissal, but it is
fact are raised bv the

made no mention of
claim in its Order of
clear that issues of
claim.

Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
Alter ego is seldom a proper subject for summary judgment in
view of the doctrine's dependency on the facts and circumstances
of the individual case:
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lames

1

ii

Hood

R.

mi i

without

repayment provisions or security;
not

loans

(Laulere

Dep.,

p.

such advances to James were

17; R.

366);

Hood

has

also

guaranteed loans by third parties to James, including one in an
approximate amount of $300,000.00

(Laulere Dep., p. 18; R. 366);

no security was ever provided by James for money advanced or the
loans guaranteed by Hood. (Laulere Dep., p. 34; R. 366).
When

Hood

Corporation

negotiated

to

acquire

James,

it

installed James Foreman, a long time Hood employee, with James.
(James Foreman dep., pp. 5-6; R.365).

Foreman, however, did not

sever his ties with Hood but continued to act as a representative
of Hood and was paid his salary by Hood (Foreman dep., p. 7; R.
365).

With respect to corporate

formalities, James kept no

formal minutes of any meetings of its Board of Directors.

(James

Answers to SLCC's first set of Interrogatories No. 77).
The above Statement of Facts demonstrates that the directors
and officers of James did not act independently in the interest
of the subsidiary James, but rather were directed by the parent
corporation, Hood.

These undisputed facts create an issue of

fact as to whether Hood is the alter ego of James.

It is clear,

therefore, that summary judgment for Hood was improper and the
District Court's decision should be reversed.
B.

Hood was not Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Alter Ego

Issue as a Matter of Law.
Assuming, arguendo, the non-existence of any material issue
of fact, summary judgment is nevertheless proper only where the
moving party has made a "showing which precludes, as a matter of
10
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Subsequent
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The

alter ego claim, as the subject of an interlocutory decision, was
subject to the same principles governing summary judgment, and
the Court should have viewed the evidence presented by SLCC in a
light most favorable to SLCC.

Notwithstanding Rule 54(b), the

Court apparently treated the decision as a final judgment and
refused to review the merits of the alter ego claim.
Under Rule 54(b), the District Court's interlocutory summary
judgment

was

not

a

final

decision.

The

lawsuit

was

not

terminated as to either Hood or the alter ego claim, absent a
Rule 54(b) certification and entry of final judgment.

Rule 54(b)

provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether
it was a claim,
counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of
the claims or parties only upon an expressed
determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis
added).

In this case there are multiple parties (Hood, James, Industrial
Indemnity), and the District Court's decision involved only one
of those parties

(Hood).

Therefore, the Summary Judgment in

favor of Hood was not a final judgment
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and was subject to

revision,

Neider v» S t a t e Department of Transportation, 6 65 P.2d
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favoring

decisions

Excavating ,

of

Inc.

.ii" i

cJaiiiis

cases

on

.....v,..,.,,,_ Agla

Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah

1980), is furthered by the

provisions of Rule 54(b).
Rather than treating its decision as interlocutory under
Rule 54(b), the District Court apparently considered its decision
as a final judgment having res judicata force and refused to
review the alter ego issue.

The District Court based its refusal

to review alter ego on factors tantamount to a Rule 60(b) motion
for relief from final judgments.

The lower court ruled that it

is not in the interest of justice to consider a matter more than
once, that Hood would be prejudiced if the decision were revised,
and further held SLCC to higher standards than other parties. (R.
302-304).
These factors upon which the Court predicated its decision
are inapplicable where the lawsuit was not terminated as to Hood
and the alter ego claim.

The decision of the Court was not a

final judgment and had no res judicata effect.

Warner Bros, v.

American Broadcasting Companies. 720 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1983).
The request of SLCC to review the decision, therefore, was not a
request to consider for a second time a matter finally determined
on its merits.

Furthermore, Hood could not have been prejudiced

by the Court's review of the alter ego issue since the lawsuit
was never terminated as to Hood and Hood elected not to finalize
the decision by requesting a Rule 54(b) certification. SLCC was
entitled to have the matter fully considered on its merits when
it moved for revision of the decision.
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The denial of SLCC's

Motion to Reconsider, therefore, should be reversed and remanded
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government when appearing as a litigant like
any private individual.
Many other jurisdictions have held that a governmental entity
participating in judicial proceedings occupies the same position
as any other litigant.

Campbell Building. Co. v. State Road

Commission, 70 P.2d 857, (Utah 1937); Alpert v. Commonwealth, 258
N.E.2d 755 (Mass. 1970); State v. Jasco Aluminum Products Corp.,
421 S.W.2d 409 (Texas 1967); Lyon & Sons v. N.C. State Bd. of
Ed. , 238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953); Commonwealth v. Bowman,
267 Kty. 50, 100 S.W.2d 801 (1937).
In view of the Court's ruling that SLCC was to be held to a
higher standard than other parties, it appears that the Court
failed

to

relative

apply
to

the

appropriate

standards

summary

judgments.

When

discussed
SLCC

above

moved

for

reconsideration, the lower court continued to hold SLCC to an
inappropriately

high

standard.

At

that

hearing,

the

Court

refused to even consider the alter ego claim and the evidence of
material
judgment.

issues

of

fact which

should have precluded

summary

Furthermore, the Court abused any discretion it had in

refusing to reconsider the alter ego claim and denying SLCC's
Motion to Amend

when

it failed

to treat

SLCC as any other

litigant.
SLCC was obviously prejudiced by the above treatment in the
District Court.

Rather than being on an equal footing with the

other parties in this litigation, SLCC was disadvantaged in any
proceedings in this matter and was denied the right normally
afforded

litigants to have its motions, claims and arguments
16

considere.
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CONCLUSION

.

• •
=

In view of the above,, i t i s manifest that the District Court
in granting summary judgment :i i: i favor of: Hnod Corporation
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further proceedings.
Dated th is ,, ^tyM:

day of August,- 1987,
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
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ADDENDUM

1H

DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Defendant
Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,

:
J
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

:

Defendant.

s

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation, HOOD
CORPORATION, a California
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY:, a
California corporation,
Defendants.

:
:

Civil No. C84-2357
Judge Judith M. Billings

The third party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for
Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable Judith M. Billings, District Judge, on the 2nd day
of August, 1985, such defendant being represented by their
attorney of record David A. Reeve, and third party plaintiff
Salt Lake City Corporation being represented by their

attorney Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., and the plaintiff and third
party defendant James Constructors, Inc.

being represented

by their attorney of record C. Reed Brown,

The court having

reviewed the pleadings on file herein, together with third
party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for Summary
Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Marc Laulhere and the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and
having reviewed the reply affidavit of Arthur L. Keesler,
Jr., attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, and having
heard arguments from the respective counsel, and based upon
the motion of third party defendant's attorney, David A.
Reeve, the court does hereby enter the following:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
That all causes of action brought by the third party
plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation against third party
defendant Hood Corporation are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

Further, both parties hereto are to bear their

own attorney's fees and costs of court incurred herein.
DATED this

day of August, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

JUDITH M. BILLINGS
District Court Judge

ARTHUR L. KEESLER, JR. //
Attorney for Salt Lake' City

Corporation-^

^

DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Defendant
Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Plaintiff,

:
;
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

!

VS.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation, HOOD
CORPORATION, a California
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,
Defendants.

:
:

Civil No. C84-2857
Judge Judith M. Billings

Third party defendant Hood Corporations Motion for
Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable Judith M. Billings, District Judge, on the 2nd day
of August, 1985.

Third party defendant Hood Corporation

being represented by their attorney of record David A. Reeve,
third party plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation being

represented by their attorney Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., and the
plaintiff and third party defendant James Constructors, inc.
being represented by their attorney of record C. Reed Brown*
The court having reviewed the pleadings on file hereinf
together with third party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion
for Summary Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Marc
Laulhere and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
support thereof, and having reviewed the reply affidavit of
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., attorney for Salt Lake City
Corporation, and having heard arguments from the respective
counsel, and being further fully advised in the premises,
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Third party defendant Hood Corporation is entitled

to a summary judgment as prayed, dismissing all causes of
action brought by Salt Lake City Corporation against such
third party defendant.
2.

That the third party plaintiff Salt Lake City

Corporation has not raised any material fact issues as to the
alter ego theory of recovery against third party defendant
Hood Corporation, which would prevent a summary judgment from
issuing.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court
does hereby make the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Third party defendant Hood Corporation is granted a

summary judgment, dismissing all causes of action brought

by the third party plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation.
2.

That no factual issues have been raised by third

party plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation to prevent the
summary judgment from being issued.
DATED this

day of August, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

JUDITH M. BILLINGS
District Court Judge

DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Defendant
Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,

:
:i

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

:

Defendant.

SECOND AMENDED ORDER

j

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,

:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a
Nvvada corporation; HOOD
V;;PORATION, a California
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,

i
:
:

Civil No.

C-84-2857

Judge Judith Billings

:

Defendants.
Salt Lake City Corporation's (SLCC) Motion for
Reconsideration and Leave to Amend Their Complaint as to the
defendant Hood Corporation, came on regularly for hearing on the
22nd day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Judith Billings,
District Court Judge.

SLCC being represented by their attorneys

of record, Wilfred A. Beasley and Stanford P. Fitts, the Hood

Corporation being represented by their attorney of record David
A. Reeve, James Constructors, Inc. being represented by their
attorneys of record, Jay Jensen and C. Reed Brown, and Industrial
Indemnity Company being represented by their attorney of record
C. Reed Brown.

The court having heard the arguments of counsel

with regard to the procedural aspects of SLCC's motion for
reconsideration, and having heard arguments with regard to their
motion for leave to amend their complaint, and having reviewed
all pleadings and memorandum submitted in support and in
opposition to said motions, and the court having made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to reconsider,

pursuant to Rule 54(b), the prior entry of summary judgment
against the Hood Corporation is denied.
2.

That Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to amend their

Complaint to add a cause of action under the alter ego theory,
against the Hood Corporation, is denied.
3.

That the prior Summary Judgment entered on the 21st day

of August, 1985, in favor of the Hood Corporation, is hereby
certified and directed by the court to be a final judgment, for
aopeal purposes, inasmuch as the court makes an express finding
that there is no reason for delay.
DATED this

day of January, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

JUDITH BILLINGS
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, this / )
January, 1987 to the following:
Wilford A. Beesley
Stanford P. Fitts
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation
310 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
C. Reed Brown
HINTZE & BROWN
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc.
and Industrial Indemnity Company
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Jay Jensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

/'

j

day of

DAVID A. REEVE #2717
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS E. WEST
Attorney for Defendant
Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

:
!

VS .

SECOND AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

!

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.

i

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,

:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a
Nevada corporation; HOOD
CORPORATION, a California
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,

:

Civil No.

C-84-2857

:

Judge Judith Billings

Defendants.
Salt Lake City Corporation's (SLCC) Motion for
Reconsideration and Leave to Amend Their Complaint as to the
defendant Hood Corporation, came on regularly for hearing on the
22nd day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Judith Billings,
District Court Judge.

SLCC being represented by their attorneys

of record, Wilfred A. Beasley and Stanford P. Fitts, the Hood

Corporation being represented by their attorney of record David
A. Reeve, James Constructors, Inc. being represented by their
attorneys of record, Jay Jensen and C. Reed Brown, and Industrial
Indemnity Company being represented by their attorney of record
C. Reed Brown.

The court having heard the arguments of counsel

with regard to the procedural aspects of SLCC's motion for
reconsideration, and having heard arguments with regard to their
motion for leave to amend their complaint, and having reviewed
all pleadings and memorandum submitted in support of and in
opposition to said motions, and the court being further fully
advised in the premises, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the prior summary judgment was granted inasmuch as

that order was signed on the 21st of August, 1985 and this motion
was heard on the 22nd of December, 1986.

Based on the time

elapsed, it would be prejudicial to the Hood Corporation if the
court was to reconsider their prior order.
2.

That discovery has taken place during the period of time

after the summary judgment was granted and the current motion,
including the depositions of the following individuals:

Tim

Doxey, November 4, 1985; Milt Winward, November 5, 1985; Elaine
D. Christensen, January 6, 1986; Sharon Bennett, January 6, 1986;
Lawrence Allen, November 4, 1985; Larry Christensen, November 5,
1985; Clyde Bennett, November 5, 1985; and Mark Stanley, November
5, 1985.
3.

That the court feels it is not proper to reconsider a

matter which has been argued and resolved on the merits, such

being the case at hand.
4.

That the alter ego theory of liability raised by SLCC,

though not mentioned specifically, was pleaded in the Amended
Complaint of SLCC, based upon the factual allegations between the
said companies, inasmuch as the Complaint was inartfully drafted,
and no legal claims specifically were set forth therein, such
wording can be interpreted to plead the alter ego theory of
liability.
5.

That the prior <-*ntry of summary judgment, entered on the

21st day of August, 1985, should be certified as a final
judgment, for appeal purposes, the court finding there is no just
reason for delay.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That pursuant to Rule 54(b) the court has the authority

to reconsider their prior entry of summary judgment in favor of
the Hood Corporation.
2.

That it is not in the interest of justice that a party

have more than one day in court concerning the saiuo factual
issues .
3.

That the alter ego theory of liability raised by SLCC,

though not mentioned specifically, was pleaded in the Amended
Complaint of SLCC, based upon the factual allegations between the
said companies, inasmuch as the Complaint was inartfully drafted,
and no legal claims specifically were set forth therein, such
wording can be interpreted to plead the alter ego theory of

liability.
4.

That the affidavit submitted by the attorney Lor SLCC,

Arthur Kessler, raised the alter ego theory in detail at the time
of Hood's initial summary judgment motion, and the court did
enter summary judgment in behalf of the Hood Corporation, after
fully considering the alter ego theory of liability inasmuch as
it was argued as if raised by the pleadings and was fully
discussed by SLCC's affidavit in their summary judgment argument.
5.

That because SLCC is a government entity, it should be

held to a higher standard of performance inasmuch as it has vast
resources to draw from in pursuing a legal action against a
private entity.

Further, SLCC is bound by the actions of the

counsel they retain and the performance of such counsel.
6.

That the court feels it is not proper to reconsider a

matter which has been argued and resolved on the merits, such
being the case at hand.
7.

That SLCC's motion to reconsider the prior entry of

summary judgment granted in favor of the Hood Corporation is
denied.
8.

That SLCC's motion to amend their Complaint, to advance

the the alter theory against the Hood Corporation is denied.
9.

That the prior entry of summary judgment

in favor of the

Hood Corporation, entered on the 21st day of August, 1985, is
hereby certified as a final judgment, for appeal purposes, the
court finding there is no just reason for delay.
DATED this

day of January, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

JUDITH BILLINGS
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, this
January, 1987 to the following:
Wilford A. Beesley
Stanford P. Fitts
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation
310 Deseret Book Buildinq
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
C. Reed Brown
HINTZE & BROWN
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc.
and Industrial Indemnity Company
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Jay Jensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

/ )

day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were Hand Delivered this 20th
day of August, 1987, postage prepaid to the following:
C. Reed Brown, Esq.
HINTZE & BROWN
Attorneys for James Constructors
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Jay Jensen, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for James Constructors
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David A. Reeve, Esq.
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Hood Corporation
1300 Walker Bank Building
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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